✅ #21 fix(security): fail fast when download HMAC secret is missing (closes #7) +14 -4 6mo ago by
Metbcy ↗ analysis ↗ GitHub Closes #7.
Metbcy/mike
A Mike fork from Metbcy focused on making signed downloads safer to deploy and operate.
Metbcy's fork keeps a close eye on one practical risk: download links should not become guessable when a deployment is missing its signing configuration. A real signing secret is now a requirement, so an incomplete setup stops rather than serving potentially forged links.
That is a narrow but worthwhile operational safeguard, especially for anyone evaluating how Mike handles protected files. Metbcy's public identity signal here is the GitHub handle alone; the recorded work points toward security-conscious deployment hygiene rather than a broader product repositioning.
What's in it
- Protected download links Signed download access requires a properly configured secret, helping prevent forged links in misconfigured deployments.
- Fail-safe deployment setup A missing signing secret stops the service instead of quietly continuing with an unsafe default.
Direction
securityinfrastructure
Activity
📝 Download-signing secret no longer falls back to a hardcoded value 0 commits — securityinfrastructure draft
Metbcy/mike removes a hardcoded `"dev-secret"` fallback in the HMAC signing path for `/download/:token` URLs. Without a real secret configured, the backend now refuses to start rather than silently accepting forged token…
Threads of work (detailed view)
Download-signing secret no longer falls back to a hardcoded value
Metbcy/mike removes a hardcoded `"dev-secret"` fallback in the HMAC signing path for `/download/:token` URLs. Without a real secret configured, the backend now refuses to start rather than silently accepting forged tokens.
Pull requests (detailed view)
✅ Merged (1)
by
Metbcy · opened 6mo ago · merged 6mo ago by willchen96