cpatpa swaps the lock on the front door for Microsoft sign-in

Frontend authentication switches from Supabase Auth to Auth.js v5
with a Credentials provider. The Supabase Auth code paths are fully
removed. The Supabase JS client is no longer present in the frontend
bundle. Microsoft Entra OIDC will be added as a second provider in
the next sub-phase.

Session model:
- Session JWT is HS256-signed with AUTH_SECRET, stored in an httpOnly
  cookie set by Auth.js. The browser cannot read it.
- For backend API calls the browser obtains a short-lived (5 minute)
  HS256 JWT from GET /api/session-token. The Next.js server mints it
  from the verified Auth.js session, signed with the same AUTH_SECRET.
- The backend requireAuth middleware verifies any bearer HS256 JWT
  with the shared AUTH_SECRET. No Supabase Auth lookup is performed.

Backend changes:
- New routes/auth.ts: POST /register, POST /verify-credentials, GET /me.
- New lib/users.ts: centralised user creation, sign-in verification,
  email-domain allowlist enforcement, bootstrap-admin promotion.
- New lib/passwords.ts: bcryptjs at cost 12, min length 12.
- New lib/authToken.ts: jose-based HS256 verify/sign.
- middleware/auth.ts rewritten to verify Auth.js JWT. New
  requireAdmin middleware checks res.locals.userRole.
- BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_EMAIL env grants admin role on boot and on first
  matching registration.
- /ready endpoint pings Postgres before reporting ready.
- Sign-in responses are deliberately indistinguishable between
  "no such user" and "wrong password" to prevent user enumeration.

Frontend changes:
- New auth.ts wires NextAuth Credentials provider with custom HS256
  encode/decode.
- /api/auth/[...nextauth]/route.ts exposes Auth.js handlers.
- /api/session-token mints short-lived backend bearers.
- middleware.ts redirects unauthenticated requests to /login for any
  path outside the public allowlist.
- AuthContext.tsx is now a thin shim around useSession; the existing
  useAuth() API is preserved so 30+ call sites keep working unchanged.
- providers.tsx wraps the tree in SessionProvider.
- login and signup pages rewritten for the new flow. Signup calls
  POST /auth/register then signIn("credentials"). Password minimum
  bumped to 12.
- mikeApi.ts and seven other files migrated to a shared
  getSessionToken() helper. None of them call Supabase directly.
- Deleted dead frontend/src/lib/{auth,supabase}.ts.
- Uninstalled @supabase/supabase-js, @supabase/auth-helpers-nextjs,
  @supabase/auth-js from the frontend.

Docs:
- docs/developer/07-auth.md documents the new flow end to end with
  a sequence diagram.
- docs/security/03-encryption.md records every cryptographic primitive
  and rotation procedure.
- Instructions decisions log and CHANGELOG updated.

Note: backend routes that still use the Supabase JS client for
PostgREST data queries are unchanged in this commit. The Supabase JS
client is retained on the backend as a transitional dependency.
Migration onto plain pg is the next sub-phase.

Adds Entra OIDC as a second auth provider alongside Credentials. The
provider is enabled only when all three AUTH_MICROSOFT_ENTRA_ID_*
environment variables are set on the frontend; otherwise the
Credentials path remains and the login page omits the button.

Backend:
- New POST /auth/oidc-link route. Called server-to-server from the
  frontend Auth.js jwt callback after a successful Entra exchange.
  Authenticated by the shared AUTH_SECRET in the X-Internal-Auth
  header via timingSafeEqual.
- New upsertEntraUser helper. Looks up by entra_subject; falls back
  to email match (linking a Credentials user to their Entra identity
  by setting entra_subject); creates a new row otherwise. Rejects
  disallowed domains (org_settings.allowed_email_domains), disabled
  accounts, and email/subject conflicts (409). Applies the
  BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_EMAIL promotion. Emits user.register.oidc on first
  sign-in and user.login.oidc on every sign-in.

Frontend:
- auth.ts: conditionally adds the MicrosoftEntraID provider when
  AUTH_MICROSOFT_ENTRA_ID_ID, _SECRET, and _TENANT_ID are all set.
  Exports isEntraConfigured.
- jwt callback detects account.provider === "microsoft-entra-id" and
  calls /auth/oidc-link; on success copies id, email, role,
  onboarded into the session token. On failure returns an empty
  token so the session does not persist.
- New GET /api/auth/providers-config route reports provider
  availability without exposing any secret.
- Login page fetches /api/auth/providers-config and renders a
  "Sign in with Microsoft" button when configured. Clicking it calls
  signIn("microsoft-entra-id", { callbackUrl }).

End-to-end verification against Postgres 16:
- Missing X-Internal-Auth returns 403.
- Wrong X-Internal-Auth returns 403 (timing-safe compare).
- First Entra sign-in promotes BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_EMAIL to admin.
- Second sign-in same subject is idempotent.
- Disallowed domain returns 400 with clear message.
- Credentials user signing in via Entra links automatically.
- Same email with different Entra subject returns 409.
- Audit log records user.register.oidc and user.login.oidc.

Docs:
- docs/developer/07-auth.md: new Entra section with flow, redirect
  URI requirements, and the full env-var table.
- frontend/.env.local.example documents the three new variables.
- CHANGELOG.md and Instructions.md updated.

Adds the Credentials password-reset flow. Entra-only accounts have no
local password and are silently ignored.

Backend:
- Migration 0012_password_reset.sql adds password_reset_token_hash and
  password_reset_expires_at columns to public.users with a partial
  index for token lookup.
- New backend/src/lib/email.ts wraps Resend. RESEND_API_KEY is
  required in production; in development the email body is written
  to the backend log so the operator can complete the flow manually.
- New POST /auth/request-password-reset and POST /auth/reset-password
  routes. The request endpoint always returns 200 regardless of
  whether the email is registered (prevents enumeration). Tokens are
  32 random bytes encoded base64url, hashed SHA-256 before storage
  (raw token never persisted), valid for one hour, single-use.
- Wrong token and expired token return the same 400 message so a
  brute-force attacker cannot discriminate. Weak password returns a
  separate 400 with the minimum-length message.
- Audit events: user.password-reset.request and
  user.password-reset.complete.
- Disabled accounts cannot reset.

Frontend:
- New /forgot-password page submits the email and shows a generic
  "if an account exists" success message.
- New /reset-password page reads ?token=, validates password length
  and confirmation, calls the backend, redirects to /login on
  success.
- "Forgot password?" link added under the Login submit button.
- middleware.ts adds /forgot-password and /reset-password to the
  public allowlist.

End-to-end verification against Postgres 16:
- Unknown email: 200, no email sent.
- Known email: 200, link captured from backend log.
- Wrong token: 400 generic.
- Weak password: 400 with min-length message.
- Valid token + strong password: 200, password updated, reset
  columns cleared.
- Same token re-used: 400 generic (one-shot).
- Old password rejected, new password signs in.
- audit_events recorded both events.

Docs:
- docs/developer/07-auth.md: new Password reset section.
- backend/.env.example: documents RESEND_API_KEY and RESEND_FROM.
- CHANGELOG and Instructions updated.