Maison-Retail-Management-International tightens who's allowed to call its backend

A small security change hardens how the fork's server decides which website it will accept requests from - and guards against a config slip that silently breaks everything.

securityinfrastructure

Browsers enforce a rule about which website is allowed to talk to a given server. This fork rewrote that check so the server now compares incoming requests against its one approved address and rejects anything else, while still permitting the behind-the-scenes calls that don't come from a browser.

The more interesting part is a guard against a classic deployment trap: if the approved address is entered with a stray slash on the end, the old comparison would quietly fail and block every request - with nothing in the config looking wrong. The team strips that slash automatically and prints the approved address on startup, so a misconfiguration shows up immediately instead of after a baffling outage.

So what Worth a glance for anyone self-hosting this fork - it's a quiet reliability-and-security fix that prevents a frustrating, hard-to-diagnose lockout.

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Spotted something wrong? Or know the PR text has fresher detail than the writeup above?

Commits in this thread

1 commit from Maison-Retail-Management-International/mike, oldest first. Source extracted verbatim from the harvested git log.

SHA Subject Author Date
a2a1cb23 Harden CORS origin matching and log allowed FRONTEND_URL at startup. Thomas GUILLEMAUD 2026-05-20 ↗ GitHub
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

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