amal66 locks public legal-data tables by default

A new security baseline denies access to public-facing data unless an explicit policy permits it.

securityinfrastructure

amal66 has added a deny-by-default access control layer for the fork's public data tables. In practical terms, users and services must now be specifically authorised before they can read or change records.

That is a strong default for a system that may handle sensitive legal information: accidental exposure becomes harder, and access rules must be intentional. The trade-off is operational discipline. The team needs to import the matching permissions for signed-in users and trusted back-end services, or ordinary application traffic will be blocked too.

So what Legal teams assessing this fork should care because it treats access control as a prerequisite for handling sensitive matter data, not a later hardening exercise.

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Spotted something wrong? Or know the PR text has fresher detail than the writeup above?

Commits in this thread

1 commit from amal66/mike, oldest first. Source extracted verbatim from the harvested git log.

SHA Subject Author Date

e3efabf0 fix(chapter-15): default public tables to deny-all RLS Amal 2026-05-24 ↗ GitHub

SHA	Subject	Author	Date
`e3efabf0`	fix(chapter-15): default public tables to deny-all RLS	Amal	2026-05-24	↗ GitHub
commit body Chapter: 15 - Database defense in depth. Plain-English map: Enable Row Level Security fallback policies that deny browser/client roles by default on public tables. Why it matters: The backend uses a service role, but mistakes happen. If a future grant or client path exposes a table, the database should still default to no access. Principle: Least privilege by default, with explicit access instead of accidental access. Precedent borrowed: Upstream PR #145. Upstream base: willchen96/mike@d39f580. Original local commit: faa098c.

commit body

Chapter: 15 - Database defense in depth.

Plain-English map:
Enable Row Level Security fallback policies that deny browser/client roles by
default on public tables.

Why it matters:
The backend uses a service role, but mistakes happen. If a future grant or
client path exposes a table, the database should still default to no access.

Principle:
Least privilege by default, with explicit access instead of accidental access.

Precedent borrowed:
Upstream PR #145.

Upstream base: willchen96/mike@d39f580.
Original local commit: faa098c.

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